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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HIGHLAND CONSTRUCTION CCl-1PANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR D. ) 
CONsrRUCTION CCl-1PANY, UNITED STATES ) 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, a Mary- ) 
land Corporation, and ~ELL OIL ) 
CCMPANY, a Delaware corporation, ) 
Defendants and Respondents. 
) 
) 
LaMAR D. STEVENSON d/b/a LaMAR D. ) 
CONsrRUCTION CCl-1PANY, ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE STATE OF UTAH and 'IHE UTAH STATE ) 
DEPAR'IMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
RFSFDNDENTS' BRIEF 
Civil No. 17099 
Respondents, LaMar D. Stevenson, d/b/a LaMar D. Construction 
Company (hereinafter referred to as "Stevenson" or "respondent") and United 
States Fidelity and Guarantee Company (hereinafter referred to as "USF&G" or 
"respondent") hereby submit the following brief: 
- 1 -
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Respondents concur in the appellant's statement of the nature of 
the case. 
DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
Respondents concur in the appellant's statement of the disposition 
in the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmation of the trial court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and affirmation of the trial court's judgments 
dismissing all of Highland's claims and awarding Stevenson attorneys fees and 
costs. Respondents further seek affirmation of the trial court's declaratory 
judgment declaring that Stevenson had rightfully backcharged Highland in the 
sum stated. In addition, respondents pray for their costs incurred in connec-
tion with this appeal pursuant to Rule 54(d)(3) U.R.C.P., including attorney's 
fees under s14-1-8 U.C.A. (1953) and under Section 6(e) of the subcontract. 
In the alternative, and in the event that any portion of the fin-
dings or judgment in favor of respondents is reversed, respondents seek rever-
sal of the dismissal of their third-party claims against the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court, like virtually every other appellate court in the 
United States, has always followed two firmly established, f\lndamental rules 
in reviewing the facts on appeal. The first f\lndamental principle provides 
that on appeal, the decision of the trial court is entitled to a presumption 
of validity and the appellate court is required to view the evidence, and any 
- 2 -
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inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to sustaining the 
decision. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d, 1384 (Utah 1977). The second tUn-
damental principle provides that where the evidence presented in the trial 
court is in conflict, the appellate court assumes that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence that supports his findings. Fillmore 
City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d, 1316 (Utah 1977), and Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander 
Veur, 618 P.2d 29 (Utah 1980). 
Although on page 18 of its brief, the appellant expressly recogni-
zes these fundamental principles, they are completely disregarded by the 
appellant in its presentation of the "facts" in its brief. In direct viola-
tion of the principle that the facts and any inferences to be drawn therefrom 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the respondents, appellant's 
brief presents the facts, along with the inferences it draws from the facts, 
in the light most favorable to the appellant. This Court has repeatedly 
rejected such an approach. Thomson v • Condas, 493 P. 2d 6 39 , 27 Utah 2d 129 
( 1972). In addition, in presenting the "facts" appellant has ignored the 
facts running contrary to its position, and has resolved all disputes of fact 
in its favor. 
In view of appellant's disregard of the principles governing the 
review of facts on appeal, a complete restatement of the facts consistent with 
the governing principles, is necessary. 
FACTS 
(Prior to the cormnencement of the trial, counsel met and agreed 
upon certain facts which were stipulated to and read into the record on the 
morning of trial. 'nle stipulation of facts is found on pages 638 to 651 of 
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the record. Accordingly, citations to those pages refer to stipulated facts.) 
In the early part of 1976, the State solicited bids on a road 
construction project to be performed in Duchesne County under the name of Utah 
Department of Transportation, Duchesne River Road Project, Project No. 
RS-0256(2). Farly in the surrmer of 1976, bids were submitted by several dif-
ferent contractors, including Highland. At the bid opening it was revealed 
that Highland was the low bidder and it was anticipated that Highland would be 
awarded the contract. All of the bids were, however, subsequently 
disqualified. (R. 645) 
On or about July 27, 1976, a second bidding was held with both 
Highland and Stevenson again submitting bids. (R. 645) 
In the course of preparing Highland's bids, Highland's President, 
Bryan Bergener, drove through the project site five or six times, while 
stopping and walking through it on one occasion. (R. 801) 
During his inspections of the project site, he observed a number of 
indications of swampy or wet conditions including mrsh grass, cattails, 
alkali, surface water and seepage from the canal running along the roadway. 
(R. 806) 
A special provision of the general contract (which was incorporated 
by reference into the subcontract) provided in part: 
The bidder is required to examine carefully the site of 
the proposed work, the proposal, plans, specifications, 
supplemental specifications, special provisions, and 
contract fonns before submitting a proposal. 
Furthermore, the materials report, soil survey plans 
and profiles, and test data pertaining to the proposed 
work are available for the bidder's inspection at the 
Materials Test Division, 757 West 2nd South, Salt Lake 
City, or the district office. 1he submission of a bid 
shall be considered prima facie evidence that the 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bidder has made the required examinations and is 
satisfied as to the conditions to be encountered in 
performing the work and as to the requirements of the 
plans, specifications, supplemental specifications, 
special provisions, and contract. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 6) 
The Soil &lrvey Materials Report referred to in the above contract 
provision provided in a section entitled, "Physical Conditions Along Project" 
(found on page 1 of the report): 
Soil Trpe and Range: Project soil range from very 
plastic A-(~(In-situ weathered shale) to non-plastic 
A-1-a silty, sandy gravel. 
Drainage: Natural surface drainage varies from good to 
poor. Some water accumulates in marshy and saturated 
zones that occur where irrigation water seeps from 
irrigation ditches and canals. The ne.in area in which 
saturation zones occur lies between station 850+00 and 
station 910+00. (Emphasis added) (Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 20 and Plaintiff's Exhibit Noc 9) 
A map of the project attached to the soil survey report and 
received in evidence as Exhibit 33 contained the notation "some seepage from 
canal to drainage ditch ma.rsh and saturated areastl" 
In spite of the fact that the Soil Survey and Materials Report was 
available to Highland, and in spite of the requirement that it be examined in 
preparing a bid, Highland did not examine the report in preparing either of 
its bids. (R. 648-649; 841-842; 1112-1113) 
When the bids were opened at the second bidding on the Duchesne 
River Road Project (which took place on or about July 27, 1976), Stevenson was 
the low bidder, and on or about July 27, 1976, Stevenson was awarded the 
general contract on the project. (R. 645-646) It was Stevenson's intention 
to have his own company do the earth moving work, as he had ma.de arrangements 
to rent earth moving equipment and did not anticipate subcontracting that work 
- 5 -
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out. (R. 1234) However, shortly after he was awarded the contract, two dif-, 
f erent construction companies contacted him requesting that he subcontract the 
earth moving work to them. The first to contact Mr. Stevenson was John Wayne · 
Lloyd who offered to perform items 3 and 4 of the contract, those being the 
"roadway excavation" and "granular barrow" items. (R. 1234-1235, R. 312-313, 
and plaintiff's Exhibit 6) Mr. Lloyd offered to do the roadway excavation : 
work for $1.10 per cubic yard and the granular barrow work for $1.60 per cubic 
yard. (R. 1235 and R. 936). 
The second person contacting Stevenson regarding subcontracting the 
earth moving work was Bryan Bergener of Highland Construction Company. The 
initial contact was made by Bergener contacting Stevenson by telephone at his 
home approxiamtely on August 1, and Stevenson agreed to meet with him on 
August 3. (R. 1235-1236). 
At the August 3 meeting, Stevenson informed Bergener of Lloyd's 
off er and of Stevenson's desire to have his own company perform the work. 
However, Stevenson ultimately agreed to allow Highland to perform the earth 
moving work at $1.20 per cubic yard for the roadway excavation and $1.80 per 
cubic yard for the granular barrow. At the August 3 meeting an oral agreement 
was reached between Stevenson and Bergener (acting on behalf of Highland) 
which provided that Highland would perform the earth moving operations on the 
project, including all of the work incidental to those operations such as 
clearing, watering, and rolling, and would prepare the road grade to the point 
that it was ready for graveling and oiling. While Highland was performing its 
work, Stevenson would install the pipes and culverts at various points 
crossing the roadway and would construct a concrete lined ditch along a por-
- 6 -
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tion of the roadway. (R. 1237-1239). 
As part of the stipulation of facts, it was stipulated that 
Highland knew at the time it entered into the subcontract that it would be 
necessary for the work on the pipes, ditch, structures and utilities to be 
carried on while Highland was engaged in its earth moving operations, and that 
Highland knew that the work on the utility items and structures would inevi-
tably cause some inconvenience and interference with Highland's operations, 
and that it would not be possible for Stevenson to eliminate such incon-
venience and interference. (R. 646) 
Paragraphs 105 .07 and 105 .06 of the Standard Specifications for 
Road and Bridge Construction (1970 edition) (which were incorporated by 
reference into the subcontract) provide in relevant part: 
It is expected that there will be a reasonable amount 
of inconvenience and delay by reason of contractors 
working within the limits of the same project ••• " 
It is understood and agreed that the contractor has 
considered in his bid all of the permanent and tem-
porary utility appurtenances in their present or relo-
cated positions as shown on the plans, and that no 
additional compensation will be allowed for any delays, 
inconvenience, or damage sustained by him due to any 
interference from the said utility appurtenances or the 
operation of moving them. 
At the August 3 meeting where the oral subcontract was ma.de, 
Stevenson did express a willingness (to the extent that it was reasonably 
feasible) to conduct his operations so that they did not unreasonably inter-
fere with Highland's operations. Stevenson did not, however, guarantee to 
Highland that it would not experience any inconvenience, interference or 
delay. Stevenson did not agree, or even discuss with Bergener, paying addi-
tional compensation for inconvenience, interference or delay, and assumed no 
- 7 -
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responsibility · for Shell's operations. In fact, some interference, incon-
venience and delay was anticipated as a normal part of such a construction 
project. (R. 1237-1239). 
Highland began moving its equipment onto the project site on August 
6, and spent the first week in clearing operations. (R. 824). On August 9 a 
preconstruction meeting was held with the project engineer and the various 
contractors and subcontractors. (The preconstruction meeting is discussed at 
length in the brief of Shell Oil Company, and to avoid unnecessary 
duplication, the events of that meeting are not rediscussed here.) 
On August 11, Highland moved its scrappers to the project and began 
earth moving operations. (R. 825). On August 12, Highland began encountering 
some areas of n:ud and unstable subgrade conditions (referred to herein as 
"soft spots"). To construct a stable road base, it was necessary for Highland 
to subexcavate the soft spots and fill them with granular material. The 
subexcavation and filling of the soft spots required Highland's efforts on 
parts of seven working days, those being August 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19, and 
subsequently, a portion of September 27. (Defendants' Exhibit 26) 
At the instruction of the Project Engineer, a State Inspector 
assigned full time to the project, Karlton Lund, kept detailed records of the 
labor, time and equipment used in sub-excavating and filling the so~ spots. 
Highland's Grade Superintendent, Wayne Davies, worked closely with Lund in 
keeping such records and conferred daily with Lund and verified the figures. 
( R. 1455-1457 ) 
On August 19, with Highland being fully aware of the unstable 
subgrade condition problems, and being fully aware of the delays and problems 
- 8 -
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being encountered by Shell, Highland presented a subcontract document to 
Stevenson, which it had prepared, and both parties signed it. (R. 1035) The 
subcontract document contained no provision providing for additional compen-
sation to be paid to Highland due to the soft spots or delays. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2). 
While Highland was performing the excavation work and building the 
road grade, Stevenson worked on the installation of the pipes and culverts and 
the construction of the concrete-lined ditch. Before Stevenson could cormnence 
construction of the ditch, it was necessary for Highland to cut away part of a 
hillside and Stevenson was required to wait for that excavation to take place 
before the ditch construction could begin. ( R. 374-375) Al though the sub-
contract document provided for Stevenson's installation of the pipes in 
advance of Highland's operation, Stevenson, to minimize the hindrance to 
Highland, installed the pipes behind Highland's operation. (R. 1242; 
1250-1258) Even Highland's President, Bergener, conceded that it was better 
for Stevenson to install the pipes behind Highland's operation rather than in 
advance. (R. 1034) Stevenson elected to use this approach, to assist 
Highland, even though it was more expensive and difficult for him to do so. 
Highland's operation experienced no more than reasonable and usual 
and unavoidable hindrance and interference from the other operations on the 
project. (R. 1025-1026; 1242; 1250-1258; 1465; 1455; 1450; 646; 1016) 
Highland's operation did, however, experience some inefficiencies 
of its own ma.king. (R. 1319-1322; 695; 1452-1455) 
Stevenson did, on a very few occasions, make some limited use of 
Highland's equipment. However, such use was always done with Highland's con-
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sent and part of such use was to assist Highland in completing its work. 
(R. 1255; 1189-1190) Highland was paid for the use of its equipment. In 
fact, Stevenson was prepared at trial to establish that he had been 
overcharged and Highland had been overpaid for equipment use. (R. 497) 
However, Highland presented no evidence at trial of the extent of use of its 
equipment, and consequently, it was unnecessary for Stevenson to present such 
evidence. 
The subcontract document expressly provided: 
Sub-contractor agrees that all work performed by it 
hereunder shall be done subject to the final approval 
of contractor and/or the owners' designated 
representative. 
Inspi te of the foregoing prov is ion, on October 6, 1976, Highland 
removed its equipment from the project without properly completing its work. 
Portions of the work did not comply with the required specifications and 
Stevenson was required to re-do the work at his expense. Highland also failed 
to properly clean up and finish some of the grade slopes as it was obligated 
to do under the subcontract, and Stevenson was required by the State Inspector 
to perform this work. The deficiencies in Highland's work were remedied by 
Stevenson at his expense, and Highland was back-charged by Stevenson for such 
work at an amount below Stevenson's actual cost of performing it. 
(R. 1279-1289; R. 1457-1460) 
Due to Highland's not completing its work early enough in the year, 
Stevenson could not perform the oiling and graveling operations until the 
following spring, at which time the project was completed and accepted by the 
state. 
Although payment or tender of payment was ma.de to Highland of all 
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of the amounts due and owing under the subcontract, Highland refused to accept 
the contract price, and in January of 1977, submitted a formal claim demanding 
approximately $60,000 over and above the subcontract price. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 58) (Under the entire subcontract Highland was only anticipating 
a total of approximately $82,000.) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) Highland's claim 
was passed on to the Project Engineer for consideration. Although nnst of the 
items set forth in Highland's claim were rejected, the Project Engineer did 
award an additional amount for the sub-excavation and refilling of the soft 
spots, based on the time and equipments records kept by Lund. (Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 26) The portions of the additional award for soft spots due to 
Highland under the tenns of a subcontract were passed on by Stevenson to 
Highland. (R. 1434; 1132-1138; and Plaintiff's Exhibit 32) 
The award of additional compensation to Highland for work on the 
soft spots was paid pursuant to the provisions of the Standard Specifications 
for Road and Bridge Construction ( 1970 edition) which were incorporated by 
reference into the subcontract. Provision 104.02 of the Standard 
Specifications provides that where "extra work" is performed, such work is to 
be pa.id for as provided under subsection 109.04. Slbsection 109.04, entitled: 
"Extra Force Account Work" provides that where "extra work" is performed, the 
state may pay for such work "on a force account basis." Subsection 104. 04 
then sets forth the formula to be used where extra work is paid for on such 
basis. That fonmila basically provides that the contractor will be reimbursed 
for his labor costs and will receive payment for the use of his equipment at 
the hourly rate set forth in the Equipment Rental Rates Schedule published by 
the Utah State Department of Highways. (Defendant's Exhibits 31 and 59) 
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,\ 
The Equipment Rental Rates established by the State Department of 
Highways were actually more than Highland's costs. (R. 1323-1324; 973-983; 
Exhibits 39 through 43) 
The approach used in computing the compensation due to Highland for 
the soft spots was not only consistent with the terms of the subcontract, but 
was also consistent with the requests made in Highland's own claim. (See 
pages 16-21 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 58). In its claim and in the portion 
dealing with the soft spots, Highland specifically referred to ~~104.02 and 
109.04 of the Standard Specifications and requested payment pursuant thereto. 
(See pages 16-21 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 58) 
On July 8, 1977, the present action was filed by Highland against 
Stevenson and USF&G. &lbsequently, Stevenson brought the State into the 
action as a third-party defendant and Highland amended its complaint to add 
Shell as an additional defendant. 
Highland's claims in the action fell into five basic categories: 
1) Its claims that the plans and specifications supplied by the 
State were defective in failing to reveal the existence of the unstable S.Ib-
grade conditions. 
2) Its claims of unreasonable hindrance to its operations by 
Stevenson. 
3) Its claims of unreasonable hindrance to its operations by 
Shell. 
4) Its claims for payment for Stevenson's use of its equipment. 
5) Its claims against Stevenson and USF&G for attorneys fees and 
costs pursuant to the Utah Public Work bonding statutes, §14-1-1, et.seq., UCA 
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(1953, as amended 1963). (See R. 162-179) 
In alleging its claims, Highland did not set forth a separate and 
distinguishable amount claimed either under each claim or against each 
defendant, but merely prayed for a cunulative total covering all claims and 
all defendants. (R. 162-179) 
This action was tried, without a jury, before the Honorable Allen 
B. Sorensen, conmencing September 10, 1979, and continuing through September 
13, 1979, and thereafter recommencing after continuance by the Court on 
November 13, 1979 and continuing to conclusion on November 15, 1979. 
Prior to the cormnencement of the trial, it was stipulated that evi-
dence with respect to attorneys fees need not be presented at trial, but that 
consideration by the Court of an award of attorneys fees would be deferred 
until after the Court's ruling on the merits of the case in chief. 
(R. 547-550; 1192) The remaining four of Highland's basic claims were tried. 
On Highland's claim of defective plans and specifications and for additional 
canpensation due to the unstable sub-grade conditions, the Court ruled that 
the plans were not defective, that the physical evidence at the project site 
and the available soils reports placed Highland on notice of· the unstable 
subgrade conditions prior to its subcontracting with Stevenson. The Court 
further ruled that Highland was not entitled to any additional compensation 
due to the unstable conditions. The Court further found that although 
Highland was not entitled to additional canpensation, that the State had 
voluntarily kept records and paid Highland (through Stevenson) on a force 
account basis all amounts which Highland would have been entitled to receive 
had it been entitled to additional canpensation as a result of such 
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conditions. (R. 570-579) 
With respect to the claims of unreasonable hindrance and 
interference, the Court found that neither Highland or Stevenson had unreaso-
nably hindered or interfered with Highland's operations. (R. 570-579) 
With respect to Highland's claim for additional compensation for 
the alleged use of its equipment by Stevenson, the Court found that due to 
Highland's failure to present evidence on such claim, that Highland had failed 
in its burden of proof on that portion of its case. (R. 570-579) 
Inasrwch as Highland was not the "prevailing party" under §14-1-8, 
UCA ( 1953, as amended 1963), Highland's claims for attorneys fees and costs 
were denied. 
With respect to Stevenson's counterclaims, the Court ruled that 
Highland had breached the subcontract by failing to properly complete its work 
and found that Stevenson's back charges to Highland resulting from such breach 
of the subcontract were proper. The Court further found that Stevenson was 
the "prevailing party" within the meaning of S14-1-8 UCA ( 1953, as amended 
1963), and that Stevenson was entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs 
from Highland. '!he remaining three claims of Stevenson's counterclaim were 
denied by the Court. (R. 570-579) 
In accordance with the stipulation of counsel at the conmencement 
of trial, consideration of the claims for attorneys fees was deferred until 
after the entry of the Court's memorandum decision. By f\lrther stipulation of 
counsel, a hearing on the attorneys fees and costs claim was waived, with that 
issue being submitted to the Court on stipulated facts. (R. 547-550). 
Highland offered no evidence on the attorneys fees and costs issues contrary 
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to the evidence submitted by Stevenson by stipulation and the Court awarded 
fees and costs to Stevenson in the amount set forth in the stipulation. 
(R. 570-579, R. 599-600 and R. 602-605) 
Subsequent to the Court's entry of its findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and its judgment, this appeal was filed. (R. 607-608) 
ARGUMENT 
The points raised by the appellant in its brief all deal with 
factual, rather than legal issues. All of these factual issues were in 
dispute at the trial level and were ruled on by the trial court after hearing 
the conflicting evidence. Appellant's brief in effect amounts to no more than 
an attempt by the appellant to reargue the facts. While the arguments ma.de by 
appellant in its brief may have been appropriate in its closing argument at 
trial, it is not appropriate for the appellant to ask this Court to reweigh 
the factual evidence on appeal. As this Ck>urt recently stated in its decision 
in the Terry's Sales, Inc., et al. v. Henry VanderVeur 2d, et al., 618 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1980), 
The contention plaintiff makes • • • in practical 
effect amounts to an argument that his version of what 
occurred is more credible than that of the defendant. 
The major obstacle to his successfull urgence of that 
position is the standard rule that the credibility of 
witnesses and of the evidence is for the trial court to 
determine. 
Of all the rules of law expressed in the decisions of appellate 
courts, there is perhaps none so well established or as often repeated as is 
the following rule expressed in the Utah Supreme Court case of Casey v. Nelson 
Brothers Constn. Co., 24 Utah 2d 14, 465 P.2d 173 (1970): 
The defendants attack upon the judgment is that the 
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evidence does not support the finding that it was 
guilty of the breach of the contract, nor the a.mJunt of 
damages awarded; and particularly so because the plain-
tiff did not keep the road grader available for use 
during the rema.inder of the contract. The answers to 
the defendant's contentions are found in the so-often 
repeated rule: That where there is a dispute in the 
evidence we assume that the trial court believed those 
aspects of the evidence, and drew the inferences which 
could fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, which 
tend to support the findings; and that upon our review 
of the record in that light, if there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence to support them they will not be 
disturbed. Id. at page 174. 
This same rule is repeated in Barrett v. Vickers, 24 Utah 2d 334, 
471 P.2d 157 (1970), 
The answer to appellants' attack on the findings and 
judgment as found in the traditional rules of review: 
That due to the trial court's prerogatives and advan-
taged position the presumptions favor his findings and 
judgment; that where there is dispute and disagreement 
in the evidence we assume that he believed those 
aspects of it and drew the inferences fairly to be 
derived therefrom which give them support; and if upon 
our survey of the evidence in that light, there is a 
reasonable basis to sustain them they will not be 
disturbed. Id. at page 159. 
Literally scores of other Utah Supreme Court decisions reaffirm 
these well established principles. However, the principles are so well 
established that no useful purpose would be served in citing f\lrther cases. 
Accordingly, the standard on appeal is not whether the trial 
court's findings on the factual questions were right or wrong or whether they 
were correct or in error, as the appellant contends, but merely whether they 
are supported by any substantial evidence. It is respectfully submitted that 
if there is evidence in the record upon which such findings could have been 
based, they stand and are not subject to attack on appeal. 
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roINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS WERE NOT 
DEFECTIVE IS SUProRTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Both at the trial court and on this appeal Highland has claimed 
that the plans and specifications were defective in that they would not have 
placed a reasonable contractor on notice of the possible existence of unstable 
subgrade conditions. (R. 881-882) 
This contention presented a factual issue which was ruled on by the 
court. After hearing extensive evidence, the court ruled that the plans were 
not defective. (R. 570-579) This ruling is clearly supported by substantial 
evidence. 
Prior to submitting Highland's bids and prior to Highland's 
entering into a subcontract with Stevenson, Highland's President, Bryan 
Bergener, visited the project site five or six times. (R. 801) IA.iring his 
inspections of the project site, he observed a number of indications of swampy 
or wet conditions including marshgrass, cattails, alkali, surface water and 
seepage from the canal running along the roadway. ( R. 806 ) A special prov i-
sion of the general contract (which was incorporated by reference into the 
subcontract) provided in part: 
The bidder is required to examine carefully the site of 
the proposed work, the proposal, plans, specifications, 
supplemental specifications, special provisions and 
contract forms before submitting a proposal. 
Furthermore, the materials report, soil survey, plans 
and profiles, and test data pertaining to the proposed 
work are available for the bidders inspection at the 
Materials Test Division, 757 West 200 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, or the district office. The submission of 
a bid shall be considered prima facie evidence that the 
bidder has ma.de the required examination and is 
satisfied as to the conditions to be encountered in 
performing the work. • • (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6) 
The Soil Survey Materials Report referred to in the special provi-
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sion provided in the "Physical Conditions Along Project" section (found on 
page 1 in the report): 
Soil TyPe and Range: Project soil range from very 
plastic A-(g-r-(In-site weathered shale) to non-plastic 
A-1-a silty, sandy gravel. 
Drainage: Natural surface drainage varies from good to 
poor. Some water accunulates in marshy and saturated 
zones that occur where irrigation water seeps from 
irrigation ditches and canals. The main area in which 
saturation zones occur lies between station 850+00 and 
station 910+00. (Defendants' Exhibit No. 20 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9) 
During cross-examination, Bergener admitted that he knew that 
"plastic" soil material was the type of soil that retains water. 
(R. 1145-1146) In spite of the fact that the soil survey and D'l'3.terial report 
was available to Highland and in spite of the requirement that it be examined 
before preparing a bid, Highland did not examine the report in preparing 
either of its bids or prior to entering into the subcontract with Stevenson. 
(R. 648-649; 841) 
A map of the project attached to the soil survey report and 
received into evidence as exhibit 33 contained the notation, "Some seeping 
from canal to drainage ditch, marsh and saturated areas." This document also 
was not examined by Highland, although it was available. (R. 648-649; 841) 
A number of witnesses testified that the physical evidence at the 
project site and/or the statments contained in the available soils and 
materials report should have placed a reasonable contractor on notice of the 
unstable subgrade conditions. (R. 717-723; 1067; 1481; 674-675; 880-882; 
1059-1060) In fact, one of the contractors who reviewed. the project in the 
course of preparation of his bid made the observation to the Project Engineer 
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that there would be water problems. (R. 683-684) 
Furthermore, Highland prepared and executed the subcontract docu-
ment after Bergener was fully aware of the unstable subgrade conditions and 
after most of the work on the soft spots had been done. (R. 1035) 
In view of the foregoing evidence it is apparent that the trial 
court's finding that the plans and specifications placed Highland on reason-
able notice of the unstable subgrade conditions is not only supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, but that it was clearly the proper ruling. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision relied on by appellant, Thorn Con-
struction Co. ,Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 375 (Utah 
1979) has no application to the present case. In that case the trial court 
found that one of the engineers employed by the state on the project in 
question had ''made a positive representation that the barrow was suitable for 
use on the project, on which plaintiff was entitled to rely." (Id. at 367) 
In that case the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant 
appealed. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court's 
finding was supported by substantial evidence and it was affirmed. 
In the present case no affirmative repl"esentations were ma.de 
misleading appellant. On the contrary, the affirmative representations made 
contained the statements: "Some water accurulates in mrshy and saturated 
zones and sane seepage from canal drainage ditch, marsh and saturated areas." 
In its memorandum decision that trial court correctly held that the 
standard set forth in L.A. Young Sons Const. Co. v. Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 
(Utah 1978) governs the instant case. In that case this Court held: 
• • . one who has contracted to perform a particular 
job for a stated price, if performance is possible, 
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will not be excused from performance or entitled to 
extra canpensation on account of encountering dif-
ficulties which have not been provided against in the 
contract. Id. at 1037. 
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the 
trial court's finding that the plans and specifications were not defective is 
supported by the evidence and should be sustained. 
POINT II. EVEN IF THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS WERE DEFECTIVE, AS CLAIMED, 
APPELLANT WAS FULLY COMPENSATED FOR THE ADDITIONAL WORK RESULTING FROM THE 
SOFT SPOTS. 
In its finding of fact number 8, the trial court held: 
The Court finds that although Highland was not entitled 
to additional canpensation for its efforts in dealing 
with the problems caused by the unstable rubgrade and 
subsurface water conditions, the state, nevertheless, 
voluntarily and by its own initiation kept accurate 
records (pursuant to subsection 105.17) of the labor 
and equipment used by Highland in making the additional 
excavation and backfill r~uired by reason of the unan-
ticipated unstable subgrade and subsurface water 
conditions; and Highland (through Stevenson) was paid 
on a force account basis all amounts which it would 
have been entitled to receive had it been entitled to 
additional compensation as a result of such condition. 
(R. 575) 
It is undisputed that the state, at its own volition, kept detailed 
records of the labor, time and equipment used in subexcavating and filling the 
soft spots. Highland's Grade Superintendant, Wayne Davies, worked closely 
with the State Inspector in keeping such records and conferred daily with the 
inspector and verified the figures. (R. 647-648; R. 1455-1457) The accuracy 
of the state's records with respect to the excavation of the so~ spots has 
not been disputed. 
Based on the time and equipment records kept with respect to the 
unstable subgrade conditions, an award of an additional compensation was made 
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to Highland for work on the soft spots pursuant to the provisions of the 
Standard Specifications For Road And Bridge Const~lction (1970 edition) (which 
were incorporated by reference into the subcontract). The compensation was 
consistent with the formula specified in Subsection 104 .04 of the Standard 
Specifications (Defendant's Exhibit No. 26). 
The approach used in computing the compensation due to Highland for 
the soft spots was not only consistent with the terms of the subcontract, but 
was also consistent with requests ma.de by Highland in its own claim (see pages 
16 through 21 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 58). 
The amounts awarded on the soft spots claims were more than ade-
quate to cover Highland's costs in dealing with the soft spots. Highland was 
paid for its equipment at the equipment rental rates set forth in the State 
Department of Highways equipment rental book which actually exceeded the 
aIIDunts Highland was paying for equipment. (R. 1323-1324; 973-983; Exhibits 
39 through 43) In actuality, Highland was overcompensated for its work on the 
soft spots, as it was not only paid equipment rental rates and labor charges, 
but was also paid again at unit prices for the roadway excavation material 
placed back into the soft spots. (R. 1509) 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the evidence supports the 
trial court's finding that even if Highland was entitled to additional canpen-
sation for the unstable subgrade conditions, any amounts that it would have 
been entitled to were fUlly paid. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT STEVENSON DID NOT SUBJECT HIGHLAND 
TO UNREASONABLE DELAYS IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
On page 21 of its brief, Highland contends that the evidence was 
uncontroverted that Stevenson assured Highland that Highland eould conduct an 
operation "entirely free of delays or interference from other on-going work on 
the project." Appellant then makes reference to the self-serving statements 
of Highland's President in the record. Certainly, appellant must make such 
statement with "tongue and cheek" as that issue presented one of the major 
factual disputes at the trial. Although Stevenson did express a willingness 
to conduct his operations so that they did not unreasonably interfere with 
Highland's operations, he expressly and repeatedly denied ma.king any guarantee 
or assurance to Highland that Highland's operation would be "entirely free 
from delays or interference from other on-going work on the project." In 
fact, some interference, inconvenience and delay was anticipated as a normal 
part of such a construction project. (R. 1237-1239; 646) In fact, it is 
undisputed that another contractor, John W. Lloyd, was willing to perform the 
same work for less than Highland agreed to perform it for and that Lloyd had 
asked for no assurance that there would be no hindrance or delay. (R. 1235, 
R. 936) Stevenson had no incentive to make such a guarantee. 
Highland contends that a statement ma.de in para.graph 3 of the sub-
contract constituted such a guarantee. The trial court's rejection of that 
contention can, however, be justified for any one of several different 
reasons. 
First, the evidence at trial established that the subcontract was 
made orally on August 3 and that it was the oral agreement, not the written 
document (which was not executed until August 19, long after work had 
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comnenced) that constituted the real agreement between the parties. (R. 1245) 
Second, the court expressly found, consistent with the generally accepted 
rules governing construction of contracts, that the sentence in question must 
be construed in light of the facts and circumstance known to the parties at 
the time of the contract and that it ITD.lst be construed in conjunction with the 
other provisions of the contracte (R. 570-579) As part of its findings, the 
court noted other sections of the contract (§§105.06 and 105.07 of the 
Standard Specifications) which provide in relevant part: 
It is expected that there will be a reasonable amount 
of inconvenience and delay by reason of contractors 
working within the limits of the same project • • • 
It is understood and agreed that the contractor has 
considered in his bid all of the permanent and tem-
porary utility appurtenances in their present or relo-
cated positions as shown on the plans, and that no 
additional compensation will be allowed for any delays, 
inconvenience, or damage sustained by him due to any 
interference from the said utility appurtenances or the 
operation of moving them. 
(R. 577) 
As part of the stipulation of facts made by counsel at the cormnen-
cement of trial, it was stipulated: 
Highland knew at the time that it entered into the sub-
contract that it would be necessary for the work on 
certain of the utilities, structures, and items to be 
carried on while Highland was engaged in its earth 
moving operations. Highland further knew that the work 
on the utility items and structures would inevitably 
cause some inconvenience and interference with 
Highland's operations, and that it would not be posible 
for Stevenson to entirely eliminate such inconvenience 
and interference. (R. 646) 
Furthermore, at the time that Highland executed the subcontract 
document, Highland was fully aware of the problems which Shell was incurring, 
and of the alleged "delays" which it is now complaining of. (R. 1035) 
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Third, Bergener admitted on cross-examination that in determining 
his anticipated costs on the project, he was not expecting an uninterrupted 
operation (R. 1016) and that, in fact, in preparing his bid on the work he 
expected and calculated in an inefficiency loss of either 27 or 17 percent. 
( R. 1025-1026) 
Fourth, both in the stipulated facts (cited above) and through the 
testimonies of Stevenson and Bergener it was established that it would have 
been impossible for Stevenson to complete his work "in advance" of Highland's 
operations. (R. 997-998, R. 1240-1243, R. 1006-1007) In fact, even Bergener 
admitted that it was to Highland's advantage to have the work done behind its 
operation. (R. 1034) 
Not only did the trial court reject the notion that Stevenson had 
given Highland a guarantee of no inconvenience or hindrance, but it also 
found, "The plaintiff's claimed delays were not caused by the actions or inac-
tions of the defendants." ( R. 574) This finding is amply supported in the 
evidence. Stevenson testified that Highland did not experience any unreason-
able interference or delay or any inconvenience that should not have norIIB.lly 
been anticipated. (R. 1250-1258; 1242) The full time insoector on the 
A. 
project, Karl Lund, testified that Stevenson's work did not interfere with 
Highland's operation. (R. 1465) The evidence further established that 
Stevenson and Shell did work weekends and overtime to complete their work 
expeditiously. (R. 1161; 1334-1336; 1439-1440; 1451-1452) 
The contention mde on page 23 of appellant's brief that, "The 120 
CMP was not timely completed," is extremely curious, as on page 819 of the 
trial transcript (R. 1443) appellant's counsel, referring to the 120 CMP, 
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stated, "Your Honor, we would stipulate the pipe was done in a reasonable 
time. " ( R. 1 44 1-1 44 3 ) 
Highland's claim of interference with its men and equipment was 
ref\lted by Stevenson's testimony and by Bergener's own admissions. Any use of 
Highland's men and equipment was done only by request, with Highland's consent 
and Highland was canpensated for it. (R. 1189-1190; 1254-1256; Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 32) 
The remaining claims of ''hindrance and delay" were also refuted by 
substantial evidence. Through the cross-examination of Bergener it became 
apparent that the so-called "delays" experienced by Highland were not 
unreasonable and were not, in fact, delays at all. For example, Bergener, in 
describing the "delays" stated that if two scrapers, travelling different 
directions arrived at the same time at a point in the road that was narrowed 
while a pipe was being installed, one scraper would have to slow down or stop 
while the other passed. Bergener estimated that this would result in a 
"delay" of 5 to 10 seconds. (R. 1028-1029) The State Inspector testified 
that with only two scrapers working on the entire project such an occurrence 
would have been extremely rare, and that he did not recall ever seeing it 
happen. (R. 1451) Stevenson also testified that he did not recall seeing one 
scraper stop for another at a pipe. (R. 1253) 
It is highly significant to note that Highland's contentions that 
Stevenson and Shell delayed its operations were based virtually excusively on 
the testimony of Bryan Bergener who was rarely on the project. Karl lllnd, the 
State Inspector who was required to be on the project full time, testified 
that he only saw Bergener on the project two or three times during the entire 
- 25 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two months of Highland's operation. (R. 1460) Stevenson, who also worked 
full time on the project, testified that he only saw Bergener four or five 
times during that entire period and that he did not stay ver"f long when he did 
come. (R. 1319) Even Bergener admitted on cross-examination that he did not 
actually see the delays claimed by Highland stating, "I was never there during 
working hours watching them run over that particular spot." (R. 1028) It is 
certainly significant that the witnesses who were on the project full time all 
testified that Highland's operation was not delayed, while Bergener, who was 
not even on the project, claimed that the delays were substantial. It is also 
significant that Wayne Davies, Highland's foreman on the project, was not 
called by Highland to testify. 
In view of this, it is not surprising that the trial court chose to 
believe the testimonies of the State Highway Department personnel and 
Stevenson and to discount the testimony of Bergener. 
roINT IV: TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT SHELL FAILED TO 
COMPLETE THE RELOCATION OF ITS LINES WITHIN THE TIME PROMISED OR WITHIN A 
REASONABLE TIME. 
Highland's claims for the alleged hindrance and delay resulting 
from Shell's operations in moving its pipeline are directed chiefly at Shell. 
In view of this, and in view of the fact that the evidence supporting the 
trial court's ruling is discussed extensively in the brief filed by Shell, an 
extensive discussion of this point here is unwarranted and will not be 
undertaken. However, Highland has claimed in its brief that Stevenson is 
liable for Siell 's allegedly inadequate performance even if Shell is not. 
Consequently, a response by Stevenson to that claim is needed here. 
The weakness of Highland's position on this issue is readily 
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apparent. Certainly if a finding by the trial court that Shell's performance 
was adequate and reasonable is sustainable as far as Shell is concerned, it is 
sustainable as to Stevenson. And, there is ample evidence in the record to 
sustain such a finding. 
The detailed diaries kept by the state inspectors and the testimony 
of the inspectors confirms that Shell did, in fact, work at least twelve hours 
a day every day, including Saturdays and Sundays, until its work was 
canpleted. (R. 1160-1161) l'-1r'. Cornwall, the State Inspector, specifically 
assigned to the Shell operation, testified that the work was completed as soon 
as was reasonably possible under the circumstances. (R. 1439-1441) 
Furthermore, most of the time that Shell did spend working was spent working 
out in the fields on either side of the right-of-way where it offered no 
hindrance whatsoever to Highland's equipment along the right-of-way. Shell's 
operation was only in the right-of-way three days (R. 1168) and even under 
Highland's version of the facts, it anticipated hindrance from Shell for four 
days. (Appellant's Brief, p. 26) 
Furthermore, the moving of the Shell pipeline was not part of the 
contract on the project, but was the subject of a separate contract between 
Shell and the State. Stevenson had no contract with or authority over Shell. 
This fact was well known to Highland before it subcontracted with Stevenson. 
Stevenson never agreed to be responsible for the Shell operation and, in fact, 
the Shell operation was never even disc~ssed between Stevenson and Highland at 
the time the subcontract was ma.de. (R. 1237 to 1238) 
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POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE "TOTAL COST" 
THEORY TO THE COMPUTATION OF HIGHLAND'S ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
In Point IV of the Appellant's Brief, the appellant contends that 
11 
• 
.,. 
the trial court erred in failing to apply the "total cost" theory to the com- .~ 
pu tat ion of Highland's da.nages. This contention is wrong from two separate 
reasons. 
SUBroINT A: THE COURT'S RULING ON THE LIABILITY ISSUES 
RENDERED THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ISSUE MOOT. 
In its decision, the trial court found against Highland on all of : 
its claims and issued a verdict of no cause of action on Highland's Complaint. : 
The decision adverse to Highland on the liability issues rendered the decision 
as to whether Highland could properly use the "total cost" approach in 
measuring its da.nages moot. In fact, the trial court expressly so stated in 
its memorandum decision with the following statement: 
In view of the foregoing, the Court need not reach the 
issue of measure of damages. (R. 527) 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in 
failing to rule on a moot issue. 
SUBroINT B: EVEN IF THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ISSUE HAD 
BEEN REACHED, THE REJECTION OF THE "TOTAL COST" THEORY 
BY THE COURT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROPER. 
In its brief Highland contends that the Utah Supreme Court in its 
decision in Thorn Construction Co. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 
P.2d 365 (Utah, 1979), expressly adopted the "total cost" approach. An exami-
nation of that decision, however, clearly reveals that that is not the case. 
At least the "total cost" theory referred to by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Thorn case is not the same as the "total cost" theory which Highland attempted 
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to use in this case. From the statements made by the Court in its decision 
it is evident that when it referred to the "total cost" theory, it was doinf 
nothing rrore than referring to the "force account" theory and not to thE 
approach used by Highland in the present action. (See page 370 of the Thorr 
decision.) 
In Thorn, the Court did not hold that the formula for additiona~ 
canpensation set forth in the standard specifications could be totally ignore< 
as Highland has attempted to do, but on the contrary, it expressly cited thE 
Standard Specifications and expressed its approval of the "force account" for-
mula set forth in them. The approach taken in the Thorn case is not incon· 
sistent with the one taken by the project engineer in the instant case. 
Highland was compensated on a "force account" basis for its work on thE 
unstable subgrade conditions pursuant to the force account formula set fortt 
in the Standard Specifications. '!he Thorn case does not stand for the propo-
sition, and nothing in it suggests, that Highland was entitled to completel~ 
disregard the terms of the subcontract, the provisions of the Standarc 
Specifications, and traditional rules governing recovery of damages. Nor doe~ 
the Thorn decision support Highland's contention that because it encounterec 
difficulties in one aspect of the project, it was entitled to recover all 01 
its costs, plus a fifteen percent profit on the entire project (regardless oj 
its own errors and inefficiencies). 'nlis is evident from the following state· 
ment from the Thorn decision: 
In its conclusions of law, the Court held plaintiff was 
entitled to compensation for extra expenses incurred in 
obtaining and transporting barrow from the Crandal pit, 
and in widening the turning area where the access road 
met the existing roadway. No mention is ma.de of any 
compensation because of the under run alone, and it is 
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unclear whether any amount was awarded on that basis. 
However, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to 
support the award based on its expenses associated with 
obtaining barrow from the Crandal pit, and with 
widening the turning area; and on that basis, we 
sustain the award of the Court. Id. at 370. 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in Point VI 
hereafter, it is evident that the trial court could have and should have 
rejected Highland's purported application of the total cost theory in the 
instant case. 
rorNT VI: DUE TO ITS ATI'EMPrED USE OF THE "TOTAL COST" THEORY, HIGHLAND 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE. SUCH FAILURE PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE 
AND ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
It is generally held that a trial court's decision should be upheld 
on appeal if it was proper for any reason. Cole v. Kyle, 348 P.2d 960 (Colo. 
1960); Wilkerson v. Stevenson, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31 (1965); Thompson v. 
Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P.2d 801 (1970) 
This rule provides an additional and alternative basis for the 
trial court's decision in the instant case to be sustained on appeal. At the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's case at the trial level, the defendants moved 
for the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims on the ground that plaintiff had 
failed to establish a prima facie case. (R. 478-504) Although the trial 
court chose to base its decision on other grounds, that ground could have 
served as the basis for the trial court's decision and certainly could be an 
appropriate basis for sust~ining the trial court's decision on this appeal. 
Due to its purported use of the "total cost" approach, Highland 
made no attempt to establish any causal connection between the alleged 
breaches and its purported dama.ges. It is elementary that where a money 
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judgment is sought, whether based on breach of contract or on tort, the plain· 
tiff has the burden of proving, as part of its prima facie case, the essentia: 
elements of liability, causation and damages. 'Il1e failure of the plaintiff t< 
establish any of the essential elements is fatal to its case. 
In the instant case, Highland not only failed to establist 
liability, but also clearly failed to establish causation and damages. 
Although Highland attempted to establish some breaches on the part 
of the defendants, it ma.de no attempt to demonstrate a causal link between thE 
specific breaches alleged and any specific amount of damages. Instead, it 
simply set forth numerous alleged breaches by the various defendants, and ther 
in turn, asked for a total overall damage figure. No effort was made tc 
establish the essential element of causation and tie the specific allegee 
breaches to any specific amount of damage. 
Even the United States Court of Claims, which has a history of 
being more liberal than most state courts in allowing recovery on constructior 
contracts, has specifically rejected this approach in its decisions. For 
example, in Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United States, 351 F.2d 95E 
(Ct.Cl., 1965), the court stated: 
Assuming arguendo, that a cause of action in breach of 
warranty could have been established, plaintiffs have 
failed, in any event, to prove damages. They have 
offered evidence to show that the actual cost of 
completing the project greatly exceeded pre-bid estima-
tes and resulted in a significant net loss on the 
contract. They have not, however, established the 
approximate extent to which any of this loss can be 
said to have been attributable to disruptions in opera-
tions caused by defects in the plans and specifications 
or to tardiness in ordering changes. Id. at 964. 
In the Wunderlich decision, the court went on to sustain the triet 
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of fact's denial of the contractor's claim and expressly rejected the "total · 
cost" approach. 
In its opinion in Commerce International Company v. United States,·' 
338 F.2d 81 (Ct.Cl., 1964), the court expressly noted that the plaintiff had· 
failed to estblish the essential element of causation. In Point 2 of its -
opinion, the court stated: 
2. Causation. Similarly, plaintiff has not persuaded 
us that the commissioner was wrong in his alternative 
conclusion that any undue delays on defendant's part 
(with respect to the parts) have not been shown to have 
interferred with production. Plaintiff must admit 
that, no matter how unreasonable the government's 
delay, there can be no recovery without proof that 
delay caused material damage. (Citations omitted) 
* * * 
The primary lack is plaintiff's complete failure to 
link its accountants' general survey of the amounts of 
time taken by the government (in the requisitioning 
process) with the course of the plaintiff's operations. 
We are reminded in general terms that for want of a 
nail a kingdom could be lost, but there is no evidence 
or attempt to show, even by illustration, that the 
delay on this-or-that held up work on so many tanks for 
such-and-such an approximate period • • • • 'Ibere is no 
effort to differentiate, even by general classes, bet-
ween a resonable and unreasonable government delay, and 
to show the specific effect of the unreasonable delays. 
Other important causes of delay (such as dilatory 
subcontractors) are ignored. '!he whole subject is left 
to the general inference that long delays with respect 
to some parts must have caused damage • • • • Plaintiff 
has contended itself with broad eneralities when 
specificity is essential. Emphasis added Id. at 89. 
In the instant case, Highland also resorted to broad generalities, 
with no attempt at specificity. In doing so, Highland conveniently ignored 
numerous other factors which nust have contributed to its alleged losses on 
the project. For example, even though it counted on an inefficiency factor of 
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17 to 27 percent in its bid (R. 1025-1026), it made no allowance for inef-
ficiency in its claim for damages. It also ignored other causes of inef-
ficiency evident from the evidence adduced at trial such as: its admittec 
errors in bidding the job (R. 1108); its inexperienced and uncooperative 
equipment operators (R. 1078 to 1079); its inexperienced grade foreman who wa~ 
unable to accurately make some of the cuts on the project (R. 695); the 
failure of Bergener, the project foreman to even be present on the job most o1 
the time (R. 1319; 1460); weather (Defendant's Exhibit 48); a concrete shor-
tage (R. 1449); a scraper which consistently broke down (R. 1435-1454); 
Highland's removing its equipment and personnel from the project for a perioc 
of three days to crush gravel for a . project which it did not yet even have 
under contract (R. 1317 to 1318); its having but one cat on the project tc 
perform the operation of both loading scrapers and cutting slopes (R. 1319 tc 
1321); etc. (R. 1106) 
Highland attempted to gloss over all of these factors by the self-
serving statement of Bryan Bergener (who was only occasionally on the project) 
that none of Highland's inefficiencies were of its own making, and that all o1 
them resulted from the wrongful conduct of the defendants. 
A review of the case law dealing with the "total cost" approact 
reveals two leading cases which are representative of a large body of case la" 
rejecting the approach. '!he leading cases are Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. Vt 
Moore, 67 Cal.App. 3d 278, 136 Cal. Rp~. 603 (1977), and Boya.jin v. Unite< 
States, 423 F.2d 1231 (Ct.Cl. 1970). (For other cases rejecting the "tota: 
costs" approach see cases cited in the appendix to this brief.) 
In the Huber case, the contractor for the Fresno Convention Cente1 
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sued the architect for negligently preparing plans and specifications and for 
negligent and dilatory approval of change orders and shop drawings and overall 
supervision of the work. The contractor contended that the acts of the archi-
tect caused overall delay of the project resulting in damages to the contrac-
tor in the amount of $732,521.00. As in the instant case, in Huber the 
plaintiff made no attempt to tie specific amounts to specific alleged 
breaches, but simply sought a "blanket recovery" of the difference between its 
overall costs on the project and the amounts that it had been paid pursuant to 
the contract. As in the instant case, the contractor's manager was permitted 
to testify from a sumnary of the overall costs and attributed "every cost 
overrun to the fault of the defendants without discrimination as to other 
possible causes." (Id. at 296) The amounts claimed "included extra costs 
within the total cost without discrimination or segregation and without expla-
nation as to causation." (Id. at Footnote 18.) 
The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to use the total 
cost approach and the case was appealed. On appeal, the California Appellant 
Court sustained the trial court's rejection of the total cost approach and 
stated: 
Contractor claims that it was error for the trial court 
to refUse to allow it to proceed under the 'total cost' 
principle in proving its damage. This contention is 
dependent upon the admissibility of plaintiff's Exhibit 
3 which we have already discussed. 
* * * 
Under the 'total cost' method of proof contractor 
claims that it was entitled to collect the $732,521.00 
difference between its initial bid estimate and the 
total cost of the project as shown by Appendix A 
attached hereto. The trial court correctly applied 
principles enunciated in Boyajian v. United States, 
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supra. We think the following statement by the United 
S~ates Court of Claims in Boyaj ian, supra, is par-
t1cular ly relevant to the basic problems involved in 
the case at bar: 
Nor does the mere fact that plaintiff's 
books and records do not, in segregated 
form, show the amounts of the increased 
costs attributable to the breaches give it 
automatic license to use the 'total cost' 
method. Contractors rarely keep their 
books in such fashion. Such failure, 
however, normally does not prevent the sub-
mission of reasonably satisfactory proof of 
increased costs incurred during certain 
contract period or flowing from certain 
events based, for instance, on acceptable 
cost allocation principles or on expert 
testimony • • • • (423 F.2d at 1242) 
Contractor's position here and in the court below seems 
to be simply that although admittedly its computer 
operated accounting system did not distinguish in any 
manner between ordinary costs and alleged increased 
costs proximately caused by Architect's alleged 
negligence, nevertheless since such computer accounting 
system was kept in accorance with standard business 
practices, Contractor was entitled to collect its 
entire loss as shown by such canputer accounting system 
(plaintiff's Exhibit 3) without being required to prove 
the normal elements of damage proximately caused by 
negligence. In other words, Contractor's business 
accounting methods should be allowed to control prin-
ciples of law rather than principles of law controlling 
Contractor's business accounting methods. Id. at 621 
and 622. 
In its decision in Huber, the court went on to express some of th 
sa.ind policy reasons underlying its rejection of the total cost method: 
If we were to accept Contractor's contention as the law 
of this state, the result would for all practical 
purposes, nullify all laws reagarding canpeti ti ve 
bidding on public contracts. Under such a concept, 
contractors could submit any bid necessary to obtain 
the job knowing that the public agency (or its 
architects) would be rquired to pay whatever costs 
contractor incurred on the project if contractor could 
discover some error or omission however irrelevant in 
the plans and specifications. Id. at 622-23. 
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In the Boya.jian case, the plaintiff claimed a number of different 
breaches of a contract with the United States Government. In its damage 
evidence, the plaintiff made no attempt to tie specific amount of damages to 
specific breaches, but attempted to use the total cost approach. At the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, its claims were dismissed for failure 
to prove damages and the matter was appealed. In sustaining the dismissal on 
appeal, the Court of Claims stated: 
Defendant's defense based on plaintiff's failure to 
prove damages is, on this record, required to be 
sustained. The so-called "total cost" method upon 
which plaintiff relies is here unacceptable. 
Accordingly, there is no need to make any determination 
on the merits of these three causes, for even assuming 
they are valid and that defendant's conduct amounted to 
the claimed breaches, plaintiff's failure to make any 
satisfactory showing of the amount of damages flowing 
from such breaches would require the dismissal of such 
cases anyway. 
Recovery of damages for a breach of contract is not 
allowed unless acceptable evidence demonstrates that 
the damages claimed resulted from and were caused by 
the breach. 'The costs must be tied in to fault on 
defendant's part.' River Construction Corp. v. United 
States, 149 Ct.Cl. 254, 270 (1962). As the court held 
in J.D. Hedin Construction Com~ v. United States, 
347 F.2d 235, 171 Cl.Cl. 70, 108 19 5): 
As in all breach of contract cases, the 
proper measure of damages for defendant's 
breaches is the amount of plaintiff's extra 
costs directly attributable to said 
breaches. Saddler v. United States, supra. 
(287 F.2d 411, 152 Ct.Cl. 557 (1961) 
Defendant properly contends that the excess costs 
claimed rm.ist be tied in to defendant's breaches. 
* * * 
However, contrary to these basic causal-connection 
damage principles, no attempt is here ma.de to relate 
any specific amount of increased costs to any par-
ticular alleged breach. Id. at 1235. 
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In its opinion, the Court ma.de an extensive analysis of the law ir 
this area and reviewed the very few cases which had allowed some form of ~ 
total costs approach to be used. In doing so, the Court pointed out that thE 
approach had only been allowed in "extreme" cases, that the total costs werE 
"only a starting point" and that in the rare case where the total cos1 
approach had been allowed it had been done "under proper safeguards." 
In the Boya.jian decision, the Court went on to point out that thE 
total costs approach had never been allowed in a case involving rrultiplE 
claims: 
stating: 
None of such cases were comparable to the instant one, 
in which several breaches are alleged but consolidated 
for damages purposes into a claimed, unadjusted 'total 
cost' recovery. The above review indicates that the 
court has never allowed such a recovery in such a case. 
On the other hand, it has consistently insisted on a 
showing that 'the excess costs claimed nust be tied to 
the defendant's breaches. (Citation omitted) Id. at 
1242. 
The Court concluded its rejection of the total cost approach b: 
However, where the record is blank with respect to any 
such alternative evidence, the court has been obliged 
to dismiss the claim for failure of damage proof, 
regardless of the merits. (Citations omitted) The 
instant case falls in the latter category. 
Accordingly, plaintiff's three causes of action based 
upon the ~dulator Contract must be dismissed. Id. at 
1244. 
The facts of the instant case compel rejection of the total cos 
method even more strongly than did the facts in the Boya.jian case. Th 
Boyajian case did involve ID..lltiple claims lumped into one for damage purposes 
However, all of such claims were directed at one defendant, the United State 
Government. Tile instant case not only involves multiple claims, but multip] 
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defendants. In such a case, the total cost method is completely unworkable 
and would place a totally unreasonable burden both on the defendants (in 
attempting to :refute the damage evidence) and on the court (in attempting to 
assess the damages, if any). 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the 
plaintiff's attempted use of the total cost method must be rejected and that 
the trial court could have and should have dismissed Highland's claims for 
failure to establish the essential elements of causation and damages. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO STEVENSON 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
At the commencement of the trial, it was stipulated that the 
contract in question was a contract for the construction, alteration or repair 
of a public work and improvement of the State of Utah. (R. 639 to 640) These 
facts make the contract in question a "public contract" and bring it under the 
provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code, which deals with public 
contracts. Section 8 of Chapter 1, Title 14, of the Utah Code provides: 
In any action brought upon either of the bonds provided 
herein • • . the prevailing party, upon each separate 
cause of action, shall recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee to be taxed as costs. 
In its pleadings and at trial, Highland did not dispute that the 
prevailing party was entitled to recover its attorneys fees and, in fact, 
Highland sought recovery of attorneys fees under the foregoing section in all 
of its pleadings. From its brief, it is apparent that Highland does not 
dispute that Section 14-1-8 is applicable to the instant case and that the 
prevailing party is entitled to its attorneys fees. 
Appellant's Brief) 
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In their counterclaim against Highland, both defendants Stevenso 
and U~&G prayed for recovery of attorneys fees under Section 14-1-8. (R. 59 
In addition, the subcontract document, which was prepared b 
Highland, provided in paragraph 6(e): 
In the event Sub-Contractor defaults in the performance 
of its obligations hereunder, Contractor shall be 
entitled to recover from Sub-Contractor all costs 
incurred in connection with the enforcement of 
Contractor's rights hereunder, including court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees, whether incurred with 
or without suit or before or after judgment. 
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 570-580), thj 
trial court found that Highland had breached the subcontract and was entitled 
in accordance with the foregoing provision, to recover its attorney's fees anj 
other costs. The court further found that Stevenson was a "prevailing party 
within the meaning of Section 14-1-8 and was entitled to recover hi; 
attorney's fees and costs. 
At trial, the partyies stipulated that "evidence with respect t~ 
attorneys fees need not be presented at trial, but that consideration by thj 
court of an award of attorneys fees would be deferred until after the court': 
ruling on the merits of the case in chief." (R. 547-548; 1192) 
accordance, with the aforesaid agreement, a hearing was scheduled for April 4 
1980, for the consideration of the claims of defendants, Lauer D. Stevensoi 
and USF&G for attorneys fees and for the presentation of evidence relating tj 
such claims. (Re 548) Subsequent to the scheduling of said hearing, Highlan 
expressed a willingness to waive the hearing and to allow the claims fo: 
attorneys fees to be considered by the court pursuant to stipulation 
(R. 548) Accordingly, all of the parties, through their attorneys of record 
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entered into a written stipulation wherein it was agreed that the hearing on 
the attorneys fees question was waived and that Highland waived both its 
right to present evidence on the issue and its right to cross-examine the 
opposing witnesses. It was further stipulated that if a hearing were held · 
that Stevenson and his attorney would testify that Stevenson had actually and 1 
necessarily incurred attorneys fees and costs in this action totalling 
$19,474.00 and that such fees were reasonable. The written stipulation 
further provided: 
The parties stipulate that the aforesaid facts and 
testimonies of Roger P. Christensen and La.mar D. 
Stevenson may be considered by the court as if pre-
sented by sworn testimony at a formal evidenciary 
hearing; and the parties waive their right to an evi-
denciary hearing on the attorney's fees claims and 
waive their right to cross-examine the witnesses at 
such hearing. 
The attorney's fees claims are hereby submitted to the 
court for ruling on the basis of this stipulation and 
the record in this case. 
Highland presented no countering evidence and neither expressed nor 
offered any opposition to the award of attorneys fees and costs to Stevenson 
in the amount specified. Accordingly, the court subsequently entered its fin-
dings of fact and conclusions of law and judgments in favor of Stevenson in 
the amounts set forth in the written stipulation. (R. 547-550; R. 570-580; 
R. 599-600; R. 602-605) 
Highland, which neither offered nor expressed any opposition to the 
award of attorneys fees by the trial court, now raises that issue for the 
first time on appeal. It is fundamental law that issues and theories which 
were not raised in the lower court, will not be entertained on appeal. Park 
City v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978); Edger v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 
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405 (Utah 1977) ; Simpson v. General Motors, 24 Utah 2d 301 , 4 70 P. 2d 39 
(1970); and Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971). 
Furthermore, Highland's contention that the alleged delay in payin 
sums due it under the subcontract somehow should affect the attorneys fe 
award is without merit. The alleged delay of Stevenson in making payments ti 
Highland was one of the factual issues in dispute at trial. After hearing th 
evidence, the trial court found that Highland had failed to sustain its burde: 
on that issue and the claim was rejected. (R. 570-580) 
Moreover, by failing to file a motion objecting to the award o. 
costs as required by Rule 54(d)(2) U.R.C.P., Highland waived any right it ma: 
have had to raise that issue on this appeal. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 571 
P.2d 847 (Utah 1978) 
Accordingly, for the reason that Highland is precluded from raisini 
this issue for the first time on appeal, and for the reason that the fact; 
upon which Highland's arguments are based were rejected by the finder of fact 
and for the reason that the trial court's award of attorneys fees is supporte1 
by facts which were not only undisputed, but stipulated to by Highland; it i; 
respectfully submitted that the trial court's award of attorneys fees shoul1 
be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully submit that th 
trial court's findings and judgments were proper and amply rupported by th 
evidence in all respects and should be sustained. 
It is further submitted that Stevenson should be found to be th 
"prevailing party" within the meaning of Section 14-1-8, U.C.A. (1953) on thi 
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appeal and that judgment should be awarded by this Court, pursuant to said 
statute and pursuant to Paragraph 6(e) of the subcontract document, in favor 
of respondent Stevenson and against appellant for the attorneys fees and 
costs incurred by respondent in connection with of this appeal. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 1981 • 
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APPENDIX 
Seger v. United States, 199 Ct.Cl. 766, 469 F.2d 292 (1972); 
Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct.Cl. 233, 423 F.2d 1231 (1970); Urban 
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 15, 408 F.2d 382 (1969), 
cert. denied 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Sternberger v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 
528, 401 F.2d 1012 (1968); Turnbull, Inc. v. United States, 180 Ct.Cl. 1010, 
389 F.2d 1007 (1967); Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 
180, 351 F.2d 956 (1965); Cormnerce International Co. v. United States, 167 
Ct.Cl. 529, 338 F.2d 81 (1964); Laburnum Construction Corp. v. United States, 
163 Ct.Cl. 339, 325 F.2d 451 (1963); Lichter v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 305 F.2d 
216 (3d Cir. 1962); Lilley-Ames Co., Inc. v. United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 544, 
293 F.2d 630 (1961); F.H. MdJraw and Co. v. United States, 131 Ct.Cl. 501, 130 
F.Supp. 394 (1955); George J. Grant Const. Co. v. United States, 124 Ct.Cl. 
202, 109 F.Supp. 245 (1953); Kremer v. United States, 116 Ct.Cl. 358, 88 
F.Supp. 740 (1950); J.J. Kelly Co. v. United States, 107 Ct.Cl 594, 69 F.Supp. 
117 (1947); River Const. Corp. v. United States, 159 Ct.Cl. 254 (1962); 
Christensen Const. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct.Cl 500 (1931). 
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